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Abstract 
In daily life, people often face a social dilemma in two stages. In Stage 1, they recognize the 
social dilemma structure of the decision problem at hand (a tension between personal interest 
and collective interest); in Stage 2, they have to choose between gathering additional 
information to learn the exact payoffs corresponding to each of the two options or making a 
choice without looking at the payoffs. While previous theoretical research suggests that the 
mere act of considering one’s strategic options in a social dilemma will be met with distrust, 
no experimental study has tested this hypothesis yet. What does “looking at payoffs” signal in 
observers? Do observers’ beliefs actually match decision makers’ intentions? Experiment 1 
shows that the actual action of looking at payoffs signals selfish behavior, but it does not 
actually mean so. Experiments 2 and 3 show that, when the action of looking at payoffs is 
replaced by a self-report question asking the extent to which participants look at payoffs in 
their everyday lives, subjects in high looking mode are indeed more selfish than those in low 
looking mode, and this is correctly predicted by observers. These results support Rand and 
colleagues’ Social Heuristics Hypothesis and the novel “cooperate without looking” model by 
Yoeli, Hoffman, and Nowak. However, Experiment 1 shows that actual looking may lead to 
different results, possibly caused by the emergence of a moral cleansing effect.  
 
Keywords: pro-social behavior, cooperate without looking, envelope game, Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, Dictator Game. 
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Introduction 
Virtually all studies on human pro-sociality assume that decision makers know the 
exact costs and benefits of a pro-social action beforehand. While this assumption is helpful to 
develop theoretical models (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & 
Rabin, 2002; Capraro, 2013) and conduct behavioral experiments (Rapoport, 1965; 
Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, 1986; Camerer, 2003), in many real life situations people do 
not actually know the exact payoffs involved beforehand, but can gather this information only 
in a subsequent stage. 
 Such situations abound in real life. For example, when a friend asks you to drive her to 
some store, before making your decision, you can decide to ask for additional information to 
learn the exact payoff structure of the dilemma (how far is the store? How long should I wait 
for you?). Similarly, when a friend tells you he is in trouble and needs a temporary loan, 
before making your decision, you may ask him the exact amount he needs and when he 
expects to return it. Analogously, before deciding whether to join an ethical cause, you might 
or might not decide to gather additional information about how much effort (time and money) 
you need to invest for this cause. 
 Theorists have started considering these situations only very recently (Hoffman, Yoeli 
& Nowak, 2015; Hilbe, Hoffman & Nowak, 2015). One simple way to formalize this type of 
situations is by means of a two-stage strategic game with one decision maker and one 
observer (see Figure 1). Initially, the decision maker knows that he will have to decide 
between cooperation and defection. They know that cooperation gives a payoff dc to 
themselves and a payoff oc = dc to the observer, while defection gives a payoff dd > dc to 
themselves and od < oc to the observer. However, the decision maker does not know the exact 
payoffs. In Stage 1, the decision maker has to decide between “looking at payoffs” and “not 
looking at payoffs”. In case the decision maker decides to look, she or he learns the complete 
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payoff structure of the game, that is, she or he learns the payoff for both players. Then, in 
Stage 2, the decision maker makes their actual choice between cooperation and defection. 
 
  
Figure 1. Our variant of the envelope game. In stage (1) the decision maker, Player 1, decides 
whether to look at the payoffs corresponding to cooperation and defection, or not. If Player 1 
decides to look at the payoffs, then she or he is informed about the complete payoff structure 
of the game, that is, she or he learns the payoffs for both players. In stage (2) Player 1 
decides whether to cooperate or to defect. Player 2 is passive and has no role. What does 
looking at the payoffs signal about Player 1’s behavior? Do Player 2’s beliefs correspond to 
actual Player 1’s intentions?  
 
 This strategic situation is similar to the envelope game introduced for iterated 
interactions by Hoffman, Yoeli and Nowak (2015) and for one-shot games by Hilbe, Hoffman 
and Nowak (2015). These theoretical studies posit that “the mere act of considering one’s 
strategic options and gathering information about the possible costs and benefits of an action 
will be met with distrust” (Hilbe, Hoffman & Nowak, 2015). Indirect theoretical support for 
this assumption comes from the so-called Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH). Introduced by 
Rand and colleagues (Rand, Greene & Nowak 2012; Rand et al. 2014), the SHH maintains 
Looking	  at	  payoffs	  signals	  selfish	  behavior	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  
that people internalize strategies that are successful in their everyday interactions and tend to 
use these heuristics as default strategies when they encounter a new and atypical situation that 
resembles a situation they have encountered in the past. Then, after additional deliberation, 
people may overcome these heuristics and adjust their behavior towards the one that is 
optimal in a given situation.  
 In our envelope game, the SHH predicts that subjects who look at the payoffs should 
be more selfish than those to whom payoffs are given by the experimenter.  This is due to the 
fact that gathering information about the exact payoff structure of the game is a signal of 
deliberation. Moreover, this prediction is in line with the theoretical work by Hoffman, Yoeli 
and Nowak (2015) and by Hilbe, Hoffman and Nowak (2015). 
 However, to the best of our knowledge, no experimental studies have been conducted 
to test this hypothesis. Does looking at payoffs really signal selfish behavior in observers? 
Are people who look at payoffs really more selfish than those making a decision without 
looking? 
Experiment 1 
 As mentioned earlier, we aim to (i) measure a possible change in observers’ beliefs 
caused by knowing that the decision maker has decided to look at the payoffs of a social 
dilemma before making their decision, and (ii) measure whether a possible change in 
observers’ beliefs correspond to a change in decision makers’ actual behavior. 
 
Method 
 Subjects were living in the US at the time of the experiment and were recruited using 
the online labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk (Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis 2010; 
Horton, Rand & Zeckhauser 2011, Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). In this and the following 
studies, we did not conduct an a priori power analysis, but the planned sample sizes were 
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based on previous studies investigating behavioral changes in social dilemma games 
(Capraro, Jordan & Rand, 2014). 
 Each of 1,088 participants (57% males, mean age=32) was randomly assigned to one 
of seven conditions and passed standard comprehension questions to make sure they have 
understood the decision problem at hand. Any subjects that did not pass the comprehension 
questions were automatically excluded from the survey. The seven experimental conditions 
were as follows. 
 Received. Here all participants were decision makers, to whom we asked to decide 
between Option A and Option B. Option A would give 20c to both themselves and the person 
they were paired with (participating in the Guess Received condition described below). Option 
B would give 30c to themselves and 10c to the other person. 
 Denied. This condition was similar to the Received condition, but decision makers 
(paired with participants in the Guess Denied condition) were not told the payoffs 
corresponding to the two options. Moreover, participants were not given the choice to learn 
them. The only information they had was that Option A would be the fair option and that 
Option B would favor themselves at the expenses of the other person. 
 Choose. This condition was similar to the Denied condition. Participants were told that 
Option A would be the fair option, but Option B would maximize their payoff at the expenses 
of the other participant. After giving this piece of information, we asked participant whether 
they wanted to know the exact amounts of money corresponding to each of the two options. 
Depending on their choice these participants were paired with observers in the Guess Chose 
Yes and Guess Chose No conditions. 
 Guess Received. Each participant was grouped together with other two participants, 
named Person 1 and Person 2, who are playing the same game (Person 1 in the role of the 
decision maker and Person 2 in the role of the receiver). Participants were shown the 
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screenshots of the instructions presented to Person 1 (participating in the Received condition) 
and had to guess Person 1’s decision. Correct guesses were incentivized with a $0.20 prize. 
We opted for measuring beliefs from the point of view of a third party, instead from the point 
of view of the receiver, because a risk-averse receiver has an incentive not to report their 
correct beliefs, even if they are incentivized. For example, a risk-averse receiver who believes 
that the decision maker is going to choose Option A with probability 0.5 and Option B with 
probability 0.5 would prefer to bet on Option B rather than Option A, because the two bets 
have the same expected value (20c), but betting on Option B has an higher certain reward. We 
refer to d’Adda, Capraro and Tavoni (2015) and Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) for related 
discussions. 
 Guess Denied. This condition was similar to the Guess Received condition, but 
participants were shown screenshots of the instructions given to decision makers participating 
in the Denied condition. 
 Guess Chose Yes. This condition was similar to the previous ones, but participants 
were shown the screenshots of the instructions given to decision makers participating in the 
Choose condition, who decided to look at payoffs. Observers were communicated also the 
payoff structure of the game, and not only that the decision maker decided to look at the 
payoffs.  
 Guess Chose No. This condition was similar to the previous ones, but participants 
were shown the screenshots of the instructions given to decision makers participating in the 
Choose condition, who decided not to look at payoffs. 
Informed consent was obtained by all participants before the experiment took place, 
and anonymity was preserved all along the experiment and the analysis of the data.  
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Results and discussion 
 Figure 2 provides visual evidence of our results. Apart from the condition in which 
decision makers were given the choice to look at the payoffs and decided to do so, observers’ 
beliefs about decision makers’ behavior look very accurate. The only bias seems to regard the 
condition in which decision makers decided to look at the payoffs. The figure suggests that 




Figure 2. Proportions of selfish choices across conditions. Error bars denote the standard 
error of the means. The first, the second, and the fourth pair of columns provide visual 
evidence that observers’ beliefs about decision makers’ behavior match actual choices in all 
conditions, save the one in which decision makers decided to look at the payoffs before 
making their decision. Logistic regression confirms this (all p’s > 0.4). On the other hand, the 
third pair of columns shows that participants looking at the payoffs were perceived highly 
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more selfish than they actually are. This is confirmed by logistic regression (χ2(1,289) = 
17.90), coeff  = 0.999, z = 3.901, p < .0001, effect size = 23%). This bias turns out to be 
driven by beliefs, rather than actual behavior. More precisely, participants looking at the 
payoffs were believed significantly more selfish than in the condition in which payoffs were 
given (χ2(1,269) = 9.175, coeff = 0.567, x = 2.130, p = 0.033, effect size = 12.5%), but they 
were statistically as selfish as those in the baseline (χ2(1,344) = 1.556, coeff = -0.241, z = 
0.217, p = 0.266, effect size = 6%). 
 
 To confirm this intuition, we now report formal statistical analysis. Logistic regression 
predicting the probability of cooperation as a function of a dummy variable which takes value 
1 if a subject participated in the “guess” condition, and 0 otherwise, shows that in the cases of 
denied payoffs (χ2(1,320) = 3.817, coeff = -0.071, z = -0.299, p = 0.765, effect size = 2%), 
received payoffs (χ2(1,324) = 2.123, coeff = 0.192, z = 0.841, p = 0.400, effect size = 5%) and 
choosing not to know the payoffs (χ2(1,155) = 1.800, coeff = 0.330, z = 0.653, p = 0.513, 
effect size = 7%), there is no statistically significant difference between the choices of 
decision makers and observers’ beliefs. Hence the beliefs about the actions of Player 1 are not 
significantly different from their actual actions. However, results differ when the decision 
maker chooses to know the payoffs. Specifically, there is a strong statistically significant 
difference between the decisions of the participants acting as Player 1 and observers’ 
predictions of their choices (χ2(1,289) = 17.90), coeff  = 0.999, z = 3.901, p < .0001), with an 
effect size of 23%. Taken together, these results provide evidence for a strong bias according 
to which subjects looking at the payoffs are perceived much more selfish than they actually 
are, and this bias is not due to an underlying bias regarding the amount of altruism in others. 
 Next we examine whether this bias is driven by Player 1’s actual altruism or beliefs 
about Player 1’s altruism, or both. To do so, we pool together the data of the Guess Received 
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condition and the Guess Chose Yes condition and we conduct logistic regression predicting 
observers’ beliefs as a function of a dummy variable, which takes value 1 if the subject 
participated in the Guess Chose Yes condition, and 0 otherwise. Results show that observers’ 
significantly underestimate decision makers’ altruism (χ2(1,269) = 9.175, coeff = 0.567, z = 
2.130, p = 0.033), with an effect size of 12.5%. Similarly, we pool together the data of the 
Received condition and those of the participants in the Choose condition, who decided to look 
at the payoffs. Logistic regression shows that participants who looked at the payoffs tend to 
be more altruist, but not significantly so (χ2(1,344) = 1.556, coeff = -0.241, z = 0.217, p = 
0.266, effect size = 6%). These results provide evidence that the aforementioned bias 
regarding the level of altruism of subjects who decide to look at the payoffs is mainly driven 
by a bias in observers’ beliefs about decision makers’ level of altruism. 
 Finally, we investigate whether not looking at payoffs signals altruistic behavior. 
Similar analysis as before shows that these people are neither more altruist (χ2(1,271) = 2.768, 
coeff = 0.003, z = 0.012, p = 0.990, effect size = 0.1%) nor perceived to be more altruist 
(χ2(1,204) = 2.951, coeff = -0.398, z = -0.798, p = 0.4245, effect size = 9%) than the baseline. 
However, we mention that the proportion of people who decided not to look at payoffs was so 
small (around 10%), that it is possible that the lack of a significant effect is due to an 
undesired ceiling effect.  
To summarize, Experiment 1 provides evidence that subjects who look at the payoffs 
are perceived much more selfish than they actually are. 
 
Experiment 2 
 Our first experiment suggests that subjects who look at payoffs are perceived much 
more selfish than they actually are. One potential explanation for this bias is that the act of 
looking generates a moral cleansing effect (Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009). Moral cleansing 
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theory posits that people have a positive moral conception of themselves and that they strive 
for balance in their moral acts to maintain this positive concept. In other words, when people 
do something that they think it is morally wrong, they need to subsequently do something that 
they think it is morally right to compensate for it (Brañas-Garza, Bucheli, Paz Espinosa & 
García-Muñoz, 2013; Bandura, 1991; Dunning, Fetchenhauer & Schlösser, 2012; Dunning, 
2007). As a rather extreme example, it was shown that after contemplating paying the poor to 
harvest organs, people express an increased desire to donate their own or volunteer for an 
ideological cause (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green & Lerner, 2000). In this light, it is possible 
that decision makers are aware of the fact that choosing to know every detail of the decision 
problem will be perceived with distrust by observers. Since this action then tips the moral 
balance towards bad behavior, the agent may feel the need to compensate their behavior by 
cooperating at the next occasion.   
 To avoid this potentially confounding factor, Experiment 2 replaces the actual act of 
looking with a self-report question in which subjects are asked the extent to which they try to 
gather information about the payoff structure of a social dilemma in their everyday 
interactions, before making a decision. Moreover, in order to better understand whether 
looking at payoffs is a signal of selfish behavior for every subject or, alternatively, there are 
individual differences according to which looking at payoffs signals selfish behavior for most 
subjects, but for others it signals altruistic behavior, we implement a within-subject design, 
instead of a between-subject design, as in Experiment 1. 
 
Method 
 This is a within-subject experiment in which 213 brand new subjects (45% males, 
average age = 33) participated in the following three conditions, in random order.  
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In the looking mode condition, participants were presented a number of real life 
situations involving a conflict between one’s own benefit and other’s benefit (e.g., your friend 
is in trouble and needs a temporary loan from you. You have to decide between lending them 
money or not). After presenting the examples, we asked participants the extent to which, in 
these situations, they try to gather additional information about the exact consequences of 
their actions, before making a decision. Responses were collected through a 5-point Likert 
scale from 1 = “very little” to 5 = “very much”. After this self-reported question, we measured 
participants’ altruistic attitudes through a standard Dictator Game (DG). In our DG, 
participants were given 10c and had to decide how much, if any, to give to another 
anonymous participant (participating in one of the other conditions). The other participant has 
no active role and only gets what the first player decides to donate. Dictator game donations 
are usually taken as an individual measure of altruistic attitudes (Engel, 2011) and recent 
research has shown that they indeed positively correlate with altruism in everyday life 
(Franzen & Pointner, 2013).  
In the guess no-looking mode condition, participants were first shown the screenshots 
of subjects participating in the “looking mode” condition, then told that a participant 
answered “very little” to our question detecting the looking mode, and finally asked to guess 
this participant’s DG donation towards an anonymous stranger. Correct guesses were 
incentivized with a 10c reward.  
Finally, the guess yes-looking mode condition was very similar to the previous one, 
apart from the fact that subjects were matched with a participant who answered “very much” 
to our question about looking mode. In reality, to avoid deception, matching between donors 
and receivers was random, thus all dictators actually donated money.  
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All participants were asked two comprehension questions to test for their 
understanding of the decision problem. Participants failing any comprehension questions were 
automatically excluded from the survey. 
 
Results and discussion 
 We start by analyzing whether the measure of looking mode predicts selfish behavior 
in the Dictator Game. Linear regression predicting DG donation as a function of “looking 
mode” confirms that this is indeed the case (F(1,211) = 6.970, coeff = -0.463 , p = 0.009, r2 = 
0.032). Thus, these results confirm the prediction of the SHH that subjects acquiring 
information about the payoff structure of a social dilemma are more selfish (in a Dictator 
Game) than those who make a decision without knowing the payoff structure of the social 
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Figure 3. Average donation in the Dictator Game, broken down by self-reported looking 
mode (strictly below median vs above median). Looking mode turns out to be a significant 
predictor of selfish behavior, as confirmed by linear regression (F(1,211) = 6.970, coeff = -
0.463, p = 0.009, r2 = 0.032). 
 
 Next we ask whether this behavioral change is correctly predicted by observers. Linear 
regression predicting observers’ choice as a function of a dummy variable that takes value 1 if 
the observer participated in the guess no-looking mode condition and 0 if the observer 
participated in the guess yes-looking mode condition, shows that having an affirmative 
looking mode is a strong signal of selfish behavior (F(1,414) = 22.767, coeff = 0.141, p < 
.0001, r2 = 0.052, effect size = 14%). See Figure 4.  
 Since ours is a within-subject study, this result provides evidence that the same person 
updates their beliefs when they are paired with a person in looking mode relative to when they 
are paired with a person in no-looking mode. However, one question remains unsolved: do all 
subjects update beliefs in the same direction or are there individual differences in the 
interpretation of looking mode? Interestingly, within-subject analysis shows that 54% of the 
observers increase their expectation about decision maker’s altruism when the decision maker 
is in a no-looking mode relative to when the decision maker is in a looking mode; 20% of the 
observers have the same beliefs, regardless of decision maker’s looking mode; the remaining 
26% of the observers decrease their expectation about decision maker’s altruism when the 
decision maker is in a no-looking mode relative to when the decision maker is in a looking 
mode. Thus, while, on average, looking mode is a signal of selfish behavior, this 
interpretation is not universal: for a substantial proportion of people, non-looking is a signal 
of selfish behavior. 
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Figure 4. Average Dictator Game donation believed as a function of Dictator’s looking mode. 
Dictator’s looking mode is a strong signal of selfish behavior (F(1,414) = 22.767, coeff = 
0.141, p < .0001, r2 = 0.052, effect size = 14%). However, within subject analysis shows that, 
while this negative correlation is true, on average, it is not universally true among all 




 Our last experiment aims at extending the findings of Experiment 2 beyond the 
Dictator game. In the Dictator game, the second player is passive and only receives the 
amount that the first player decides to give. In the majority of real life situations, however, the 
second player is not passive and has the opportunity to reciprocate first player’s altruistic 
action. To understand whether our findings extend to this situation, Experiment 3 implements 
the same design as Experiment 2, but with a Prisoner’s Dilemma at the place of the Dictator 
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Game (we remind that previous research shows that behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma is not 
equivalent to behavior in the Dictator game: while virtually all subjects who give in the 
Dictator Game also cooperates in Prisoner’s Dilemma, the converse does not hold true. See 
Capraro, Jordan and Rand, 2014). 
 
Method 
 Experiment 3 was very similar to Experiment 2. The only difference was that subjects 
(N = 161, 54% males, average age = 32) played (or were asked to guess how decision makers 
play) a Prisoner’s Dilemma instead of Dictator Game. In our Prisoner’s Dilemma, subjects 
were asked to choose between two options: Option 1 would give 20c to the decision maker 
and 20c to the other participant; Option 2 would give 30c to the decision maker and 10c to the 
other person. Participants were told that the other person was given the same set of 
instructions. We tested participants’ understanding of the game through four comprehension 
questions. Participants failing any of the comprehension questions were automatically 
excluded from the survey. 
 
Results and discussion 
 We start by analyzing whether the measure of looking mode predicts selfish behavior 
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Logistic regression predicting the probability to cooperate as a 
function of “looking mode” finds a marginally significant effect (χ2(1,161) = 6.347, coeff = -
0.321, z = 1.960, p = 0.050). Thus, although the correlation is weaker than in Experiment 2, 
these results confirm the prediction of the SHH that subjects acquiring information about the 
payoff structure of a social dilemma are more selfish (in a Prisoner’s Dilemma) than those 
who make a decision without knowing the payoff structure of the social dilemma. See Figure 
5. 




Figure 5. Average cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, broken down by self-reported 
looking mode. Looking mode turns out to be a marginally significant predictor of selfish 
behavior, as confirmed by logistic regression (χ2(1,161) = 6.347, coeff = -0.321, z = 1.960, p 
= 0.050). 
 
 Next we ask whether this behavioral change is correctly predicted by observers. 
Logistic regression predicting observers’ choice as a function of a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if the observer participated in the guess yes-looking mode condition and 0 if the 
observer participated in the guess no-looking mode  condition, shows that being in a looking 
mode is a strong signal of selfish behavior (χ2(1,271) = 7.287, coeff = -0.694, z = -2.766, p = 
0.006, effect size = 17%). See Figure 6. 
 As in Experiment 2, we finally investigate whether all subjects update their beliefs in 
the same direction or, alternatively, there are individual differences in the interpretation of 
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looking mode. In line with Experiment 2, within subject analysis shows that 42% of the 
observers increase their expectation about decision maker’s cooperative behavior when the 
decision maker is in a no-looking mode relative to when the decision maker is in a looking 
mode; 34% of the observers have the same beliefs, regardless of decision maker’s looking 
mode; and the remaining 24% of the observers decrease their expectation about decision 
maker’s cooperative behavior when the decision maker is in a no-looking mode relative to 
when the decision maker is in a looking mode. Thus, as in Experiment 2, while, on average, 
looking mode is a signal of selfish behavior, this interpretation is not universal: for a 




Figure 6. Average Prisoner’s Dilemma cooperation believed by observers’ as a function of 
decision makers’ looking mode. Looking mode is a strong signal of selfish behavior 
(χ2(1,271) = 7.287, coeff = -0.694, z = -2.766, p = 0.006, effect size = 17%). However, within 
subject analysis shows that, while this negative correlation is true, on average, it is not 
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universally true among all subjects: for 24% of the observers, looking mode is a signal of 
non-cooperative behavior, relative to no-looking mode. 
 
General discussion 
 In daily life, people often face social dilemmas in two stages. In Stage 1, they 
recognize the social dilemma structure of the decision problem (a tension between personal 
interest and collective interest); in Stage 2, they have to choose between gathering additional 
information to learn the exact payoffs corresponding to each of the two options or making a 
choice without looking at the payoffs.  
 Recent theoretical models propose that looking at the payoffs will be met with distrust 
(Hoffman, Yoeli & Nowak, 2015; Hilbe, Hoffman & Nowak, 2015). The justification for this 
assumption is that looking at the payoffs signals deliberative choices rather than intuitive 
ones, and deliberation has been shown to decrease cooperation in social dilemmas (Rand et al. 
2012; Cone & Rand, 2014; Duffy & Smith, 2014; Rand et al. 2014; Lotz, 2015). This 
decrease occurs particularly among subjects living in a society with high levels of 
interpersonal trust (Rand & Kraft-Todd, 2014; Capraro & Cococcioni, 2015), for which 
cooperative heuristics are stronger than among those living in a society with low levels of 
interpersonal trust. 
 However, no previous experimental studies have investigated whether this assumption 
is grounded. Does looking at payoffs really signal selfish behavior in observers? Do 
observers’ beliefs match decision makers’ intentions? 
 Our experiments 2 and 3 provide strong evidence in support of this assumption. 
Subjects who self-report that, in their everyday life, they generally tend to gather additional 
information to understand the payoff structure of a social dilemma are both more selfish and 
perceived to be more selfish than those who self-report that they generally make a decision 
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without collecting additional information about the payoff structure of the social dilemma. In 
doing so, our results, add to the growing body of literature supporting Rand and colleagues’ 
Social Heuristics Hypothesis (Rand et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2014; Cone & Rand, 2014; Duffy 
& Smith, 2014; Rand & Kraft-Todd, 2014; Capraro & Cococcioni, 2015; Lotz, 2015; Rand, 
Newman & Wurzbacher; Peysakhovich & Rand, in press). 
 Yet, interestingly, there are individual differences in the interpretation of decision 
maker’s looking mode: while about one half of observers believe that looking at the payoffs 
signals selfish behavior, about one fourth of observers believe the opposite. Since interpreting 
others’ actions in the right way is crucial for healthy and successful social relationships, we 
believe that understanding the nature of these individual differences in interpreting decision 
makers’ looking mode is an important direction for future research. 
 On the other hand, Experiment 1 provides the evidence that, while actual looking at 
the payoffs still signals selfish behavior in observers, it is not associated with actual selfish 
behavior. In other words, the act of looking at the payoffs signals selfish behavior, but it does 
not actually mean so.   
 What is the origin of this bias? The difference between Experiment 1 and Experiments 
2 and 3 was that in Experiment 1 decision makers actually chose to look or not look at the 
payoffs, while in the other studies we only asked the extent to which subjects generally (i.e., 
in their everyday life) look at payoffs before making a decision. Hence, we conjecture that 
this bias may stem from the theory of moral self-concept and moral cleansing proposed by 
Sachdeva, Iliev and Medin (2009). Their theory posits that people have a positive moral 
conception of themselves and that they strive for balance in their moral acts to maintain this 
positive concept. In other words, when people do something that they think it is morally 
wrong, they need to subsequently do something that they think it is morally right to 
compensate for it (Brañas-Garza, Bucheli, Paz Espinosa & García-Muñoz, 2013; Bandura, 
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1991; Dunning, Fetchenhauer & Schlösser, 2012; Dunning, 2007). In this light, it is possible 
that decision makers are aware of the fact that choosing to know every detail of the decision 
problem will be perceived with distrust by observers. Since this action then tips the moral 
balance towards bad behavior, the agent may feel the need to compensate their behavior by 
cooperating at the next occasion.  
 Of course, at this stage of research this remains only a conjecture. Other explanations 
are indeed possible, including, merely, that we found a false negative. Understanding the 
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